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FoIlowing the coIlapse of communist rule and after the end of 
Europe's systemic division, for the first time in modern history Germany 
appeared in a position to develop the fuIl range of neighborly relations 
with the nations and states in Central Eastern Europe (CEE) i. e. with 
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. 
Earlier, after World War I, when these nations had regained their 
independence from Imperial Russia, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and 
from Prussia, many Germans continued, in the spirit of Bismarck, to regard 
the new states as short-lived «Saisonstaaten». Nazi Germany treated 
them as objects for the expansion of Germanic «Lebensraum» or, as in the 
case of Hungary, merely as satellites. FinaIly, the West Germany Federal 
Republic, though with a democratic constitution and willing to atone for 
past crimes, had to construct its relations with CEE within the framework 
of a common Western strategy against the soviet communist campo 
Hence, until 1989 CEE as weIl as other regions of Eastern Europe were 
evaluated less by the various nations' individuality, but rather by the 
chances to weaken the Soviet bloc's cohesion. Obviously, Poland with 
its recurrent rebellions against communist rule, then also Hungary, where 
J ános Kádár introduced the most stable variant of «reform communism», 
were seen as promising bridgeheads, whereas Czechoslovakia after the 
suppression of the «Prague Spring», despite the common border with 
West Germany, sank almost into total oblivion for another !WO deca· 
des ('). At the same time East Germany's communist rulers, owing their 
country's statehood exc1usively to Stalin and his successors, hardly ever tried 
to overcome and eradicate distrust and prejudice directed at their neigh· 
bors, despite permanent pronouncements of «Freundschaft». 
(I) As a result Germany has hardly any young politicai scientist specializing in 
Czechoslovakia, whereas specialists of Poland are numel'OUs. 
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At New Year's Eve of 1989 it seemed that Germans, Poles, Czechs, 
Slovaks, Hungarians, together with the rest of Europe, had reason to cele-
brate and to welcome the end of walls and barbed wires, preventing the 
peaple to live with each other in peace and solidarity. Today, almost 
three years later, it is obvious that those initial hopes and expectations, expres-
sed most prominently in the CSCE's «Charter of Paris» of November 
1990, were largely connected with the euphoric mood dominating the 
crowds and the politicaI leaders alike, when the monuments of tyranny 
were toppled. The process of post-communist transformation has turned 
out much more difficult than originally predicted. And the affluent, well-
-established democracies of the West had to discover that self-assured 
assumptions and designs for their own future ran into unforeseen obstaeles. 
And yet, among the former socialist countries the CEE states do 
have the best chances to complete transformations. If it would fail here, 
there would be hardly any hope for others. Conversely, demonstrable 
success in CEE would encourage the res!. That is why the community of 
the Western states, in particularly Germany are called upon to concentrate 
their support on CEE. 
I. GERMANY'S IlDAPTAT/ON TO UNITY AND FULL SOVEREI-
GNTY 
Within less than three weeks after the opening of the Berlin wall 
West Germany's chancellor Helmut Kohl presented a program of ten 
points, which amounted to a plan for a confederation between the two 
German states. (') Very soon however, it became clear that the German 
Oemocratic Republic was no longer able to function as a separate entity 
under conditions of the open border with the Federal Republic. ln order 
to provide the East Germans with a perspective where they would not 
have to migrate to West Germany, unification became an urgent imme-
diate task. The government in Bonn quick1y succeeded in convincing its 
ames in the Western world that existing reservations had to be set aside 
and that the necessary international consent to the incorporation of the 
e) cc. the text in: Europa-Archiv, 24/1989, pp. D 728-734; seen also the insider's 
diary of Horst Teltschik. 329 Tage: Innenansichten der Eilligung. Berlin 1991, pp. 42ff./ 
/54·58. 
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five eastern provinees (<<L"nder») into the FRG should be worked out 
not during a peaee conferenee with alI former enemies of Germany, but 
by an exclusive arrangement be!ween the Four Powers and the !wo 
German states. Only Poland, due to the fact that its borders with Germany 
had to be eonfirmed definitely, participated in the pertinent session of 
the deliberations among the «Two plus Foun,. The Soviet Union after 
some months of hesitation and resistanee to Germany's unity and to con-
tinued German membership in the Western a!lianee, eventualIy was won 
oveI' by chaneelIor Kohl during his meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev at 
the Caueasian resort Mineral'nye Vody ('). 
Thus in Oetober 1990 Germany emerged on the international seene 
not only enlarged in quantitative terms, but above alI free from alI the 
previous limitations of her sovereignty, imposed by the special preroga-
tives and responsibilities of the Four Powers. This aehievement was 
jusdy praised as a personal triumph of Helmut KoW's politicaI instinet ('). 
Together with his foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the two 
arehiteets of German reunification promised to the outside world that 
Germany would continue to operate within the framework of both the 
transadantie a!liance and the European integration, so that coneerns with 
the spectre of a «Fourth Reich» had no rational base: Germany would 
remain reliable, predietable, and safely embedded into larger structures 
of the Western eommunity of states. 
However, as the Germans only subsequently became aware, the 
termination of Germany's speeial post-war status under the Four Powers' 
agreements had its price: Germany can no longer claim a limited respon-
sibility for the preservation of international seeurity, leaving potential 
tough decisions to resort to armed proteetion of peaee beyond the NATO 
treaty area to the aIlies. The eonstitutional restrietion (') to assume an 
equal burden increasingly eontrasts with Germany's unlimited equal 
n Teltschik, l.c .. pp. 333-342. 
(4) For example by Karl Kaiser. Deutschlands Vereinigung: Die internationalen Aspektc 
(mit den wichtigsten Dokumenten. bearbeiter von Klaus Becher), Bergisch-Gladbach 1991, 
p. 22. - Helmut Schmidt. in his comments in the weekly «Die Zeit», acknowledged his 
successor's achievements too, but critized Kohl's failure to prepare the nation for a period 
af hard work and sacrifices. 
(5) German jurists diSllgrec to what cxtent the FRG's constitution restriets the 
employment of the Bundeswehr .out oC area». Cf. Albreeht Randelzhofer's extensive inter-
pretation oC Article 24, paragraph 2. in: Maunz-Dürig. Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, 
8and II. 6. Auflage, Mtinehen 1991. 
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sovereignty, as the discussions during the Gulf War in 1991 and after-
wards again with regard to the crisis in former Yugoslavia have shown 
already. 
ConcomitantIy, Germany has to address arrother potentiaIly contro-
versial question, thus far cornfortably avoided: What are the national inte-
rests of Germany? (0) Germany's neighbors in CEE understandably observe 
this process of redefinition already with a keen eye. Because the answers 
may not always, as in earlier years, tum out to be predetermined by a 
prestabilized harmony with the interests of the other members of the 
Westem alIiance or the European Community. Bonn's policy conceming 
the simultaneous recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in late 1991 served 
as a first harbinger of consteIlations to come. 
An additional objective element of unpredictability of Germany's 
future behavior originates, as attentive observers in CEE have noticed, (') 
in the unique task to unite in one country under one government !WO 
societies with strikingly different experiences. While on surface the com-
munist system in East Germany has been dismantIed, its lasting, mostIy 
subconscious effects on the minds of the people, together with the unex-
pected hardships of transformation under the guidance of the happier 
part of the nation, do provide for serious psychological imbalances in lhe 
united nation. Recent righl wing excesses against foreigners, incIuding 
Polish citizens, started in Easl German cities, before they spread into 
West Germany as weIl. 
Moreover. lhe rebirth of united Gennany coincides wilh a signifi-
canl natural change: German politics since 1945 had been direcled by 
generalions for which concentration camps, gas chambers and war crimes 
committed in lhe name of Germany. formed - independent of the degree 
of actual individual involvement - parts of their own biography and caIled 
(Ó) See the contributions to chapter IV af a collective volume: Sícherheitspolitik 
Deutschlallds: Neuc Konstellationen. Risiken, Instrumente (Internationale Politik und 
Sicherheit, herausgegeben von der Stiftung Wissenschaft und politik, Ebenhauscn. band 32), 
Baden-Baden 1992; also Dietcr Sellg!1aQS, WDS sind der Deutschen Interessen?, manuscript 
for: Siegfried Unseld (cd.), Proiekt Deutschland, Frankfurt (editon Suhrkamp 1811), for-
thcoming (Apdl 1993). 
(1) Cf. Anna Wollf-Polveska, Dylematy nowej kultury palitycznej, in: Rapart a jedna-
czeuiu Niemiec, Poznan (lnstytut Zachodni) 1992. pp. 7-24; Jan Urban, Germany between 
unificatian and war: Essay on Eurapean demacracy, manuscript by this Czech authar for 
a praject prepared by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Palitik as a follaw·up to the volume 
quoted in note 6. 
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for a constant inner discourse, lt resulted overwhelmingly in the unequivo-
cal conviction lhat Gennan politicians are obliged to try to provide compen· 
sation ar aid for surviving victims and to forestall any repetition, Ouring 
the coming years, a younger generation will take over for which reflections 
of this kind are generated, if at ali, by school textbooks ar by movie 
impressions, True, that new generation has grown up in a much more 
intemationalized, cosmopolitan world, Hence, future Gennan elites may 
be more immune against the bacillus of faseism and chauvinism lhan 
their fathers. Yet, they probably will shaw more hard·nosed and busi· 
ness·minded attitudes in their dealings with Gennany's neighbors. These 
neighbors, therefore, will have to adapt themselves to a situation, where 
Iinking of requests of Gennany with moral appeals will fail to produce 
results different from comparable demands addressed to olher, «nonnal» 
partners. 
The conclusion thus is warranted (') that reunited Gennany curren· 
t1y is undergoing something Iike a maturity test of its ability to act in the 
intemational environment without the safety net of lhe times, when lhe 
«Gennan question» was still open. 
II. A NEW START AND REMNANTS OF THE PAST 
The communist regimes in Warsaw, Prague and Budapest, in lheir 
relations with Gennany, of course, always had to pay tribute to the exis· 
tence of the GOR. Ouring the years of lhe .Could War» this fact severely 
narrowed the roam for maneuvers in their dealings with the FRG. Bonn's 
«Hallstein doctrine» merely reenforced this constellation. Oétente between 
East and West allowed for a considerable change. Especially lhose gover· 
nments in CEE which were eager to gain more national legitimacy in 
their soeieties by adopting a course of refonns, hoped to find sympathy 
and support in the FRG. But whereas Hungary, despite constant distrust 
expressed by the East Gennan leaders, succeeded in establishing stable 
mutual esteem with the other German state, Poland's communists perio· 
dically soUghl to def!ecI domestic discontenl by admonishing their campa· 
triotes to close ranks against lhe danger of German «revanchism». There· 
e) Tan Urban, l,ç. 
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fore, among the Polish opposition the conviction grew, they had to des-
troy the myth that Poland's survival depended on the alliance with the 
Soviet Union and on «soeialist internationalism». Rather, they suggested, 
Poland's sovereignty and territorial integrity should be based on rappro-
chement with a united democratic Germany ('). Yet, at Ihat time such 
concepts ran againts the philosophy of West Germany's «New Ostpolitik», 
pursuing evolutionary systemic change, while the conservative opposition 
in Bonn was not ready to recognize the post-war border at the Oder and 
Neisse rivers. Moreover, much to the relief of the communist regimes, the 
return of the Christian Democrats to power in autumn 1982 did not lead 
to abandoning the FRG's reluctance to encourage oppositional move-
ments in Eastern Europe. Bonn continued to practice «Realpolitik» and 
to operate under seemingly stable conditions of a tolerable status quo. 
As a consequence the opposition in CEE fel! that they stood to gain 
more fram Ronald Reagan or from Margaret Thatcher, or also from the 
Western peace movement's attacks against détente between the establish-
ments in East and West, than from the politicaI elass in the FRG. 
Thus the implosion of the communist system in 1989 and the sudden 
mutation of former dissidents fram outlaws and prison inmates into 
presidents or foreign ministers necessarily calIed for a thorough reapprai-
sal on both sides. CEE's new leaders realized very soon that Ihey needed 
their stronger German neighbor's active support for the enormous tasks 
ahead. Old grudges just had to be buried. The German government 
also was aware that in a different reality «Realpolitik» meant to assist 
the young democracies. ln particular with regard to Poland West German 
spokesmen praelaimed that the time for reconeiliation «<Yers6hnung») 
had finalIy arrived and that the German-Polish relationship should folIow 
the example of German-French friendship. 
However, paralIels of this kind tend to neglect different speeific 
weights of history: Germany never, not even between 1940 and 1944, 
dared to attempt to dominate France and to regard Ihat country as an 
object of German expansion. ln fact, centuries of French politicaI and 
(9) Cf. the recollections aí Artur Ha;niez during a discussion, published by the Sena-
te Cenler fOr International Stuclies, in: Polska w Europie, Nr. 9 July-September 1992, 
pp. 85·108. A well documented ovcrview 01 those earHer discussions is offered by Wal-
demar Kuwaczka, Entspannung von unten: M6glichkeiten und Grenzen des deutsch-polnischen 
Dialags, Stuttgart-Bonn 1988. 
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cultural superiority would have rendered any such idea plainly absurd 
from lhe oulsel (to). ln contrasl, bitler experience in CEE, above aU in 
Poland, provided fertile ground for renewed fears, nourished partIy by 
remnants of lhe old regime, partly by emerging nationalist groups, that 
too cIose a cooperation might entail the peaceful return of German 
domination. Although correctly seen by mainstream politicians as an 
obstacIe in attracting much needed German good will and investments, 
(") even the liberal democratic elites could not easily free themselves 
from a certain ambivalence. Hence, caution prevailed when Polish legis-
lation conditioned sales of real estate to foreigners on speeial governmental 
consen!. (") Notably Tadeusz Mazowiecki's first post-communist govern-
ment in Poland initially hesitated to folIow the exemple of Czeehoslovakia 
and Hungary in demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops as earIy as 
possible. Their presence somehow was regarded - against Lech Walesa's 
counsel- as a counterweight to potential German overbearing. (") After 
alI ehanceUor Kohl's apparent concern with right wing forces in his own 
party and in the electorate was not gone unnoticed in Warsaw, when 
he had tried in early 1990 to delay the recognition of Poland's western 
border. 
Maybe even more disquieting were the atlempts by Sudeten expellees' 
organization in late spring 1992 to impose their interests on the new 
German-Czechoslovakia treaty of «good neighborhood and friendly coopera-
tiom> by demanding restitution or recompensation of property confiscated 
in 1945. The noble gesture of VácIav HaveI, who only three days after 
his election lo lhe presidency had met with German president Richard 
von Weiziicker in Munich to express his disapproval of the cruel expulsion 
(10) For a similar criticai assessment sec the interview with Andrzcj Szczypiorski, in: 
RzeczpOSpOIlita. July 8. 1992. p. 6. 
(11) This aspect was emphasized by Mieczyslaw TomaIa, Zjednoczenie Niemiec! Aspekty 
miedzynarodowe i polskie, Warsaw (PISM) 1991, p. 105; idem, Polska i Nierncy przed 
nowym elapem wzajemnych stosunkow, in: Sprawy Micdzynarodowe. 1991. Nr. to, pp. 27-44e 
/38. The article contains a number of other thoughtful reflectians 00 the future of 
Polish-German relatioru. 
(lZ) The issue is still highIy controvcrsiaI in Polhmd: d. Ewa K. Czaczkawska, in 
Rzeczpospolita. June 2, 1992, p. 3. 
(U) A criticai analysis of the policy of poIand's «equidistance» belween Germany and 
the Soviet Union, as initia11y pursued by Mazowiecki's governrnent, is authored by Michael 
Ludwig, Polcn und dic deutsche Frage (Mit ciner Dokumentation). Bonn 1991. 
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of Germans from his country, thus was rebuffed exactly by those Havei 
had hoped to reach. Their attitude not only induced them to leave out 
the events of 1938/39 from the historical balance sheet and to omit 
their successful integration into West German society, but failed to support 
Czechoslovakia's fonner dissidents in their present struggle for demoeratic 
transformation. (U) 
These disturbing facts, of course, should not detract attention from the 
main scene of politicai developrnents: The series of treaties and agreernents 
with the three CEE countries were ratified in the federal parliament with 
strong bipartisan support. Public opinion, as rcflected in the mass media, 
also shows a high degree of awareness of how important for Gennany 
friendship and good neighborhood with CEE are. 
III. ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROBLEMS lN BILATERAL RELATlONS 
The disappearance of the systemic borderline at the Elbe river, origi-
nally designed in the days of the «Cold War» as an «iron curtain», has 
revealed the existence of another line, aptly to be called, following president 
Walesa, a «silvery curtains». It coincides - because the fonner GDR, 
despite similar problems, is a special case - with united Germany's eastern 
border and separates those European states, where pluralist democracy 
and market economy have been eonstructed. from the area whieh has 
just received the belated chance to follow suit on the same path. Naturally 
therefore, prudent seH-interest alone suffices to justify German engagement, 
because failure of the transformation, resulting in social upheaval, armed 
conflicts, waves of emigrants, and possibly even in replacing democracy 
by authoritarian regimes. would affeet Germany most directly. Yet it goes 
without saying that engagement caused merely by negative eoncerns will 
achieve less compared with a positive motivation based on sympathy and 
respect for the partners in the East. (") 
(14) Jiri Dienstbier, at that time still foreign minister of the CSFR, reacted accordingly; cf. 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 13. 1992, p. 2, - The Bavarian govemment. acting as a 
protector of the Sudeten's interests. rejected the German-Czechoslovak treaty during the 
debate in the Bundesrat on the Tune 26, 1992, see: Das Parlament. JuIy 10-17, p. 9. Thomas 
Goppel, Bavaria's minister for European affairs, explained his govemment's position in an 
interview with: Prager Zeitung, Nr. 45, November 5, 1992, pp. 1/3. 
(15) Cf. Christoph Royen, Niemcy i Polacy: Sasiedzi nie musza sie lubic, lecz szanowac, in: 
Zycie Warszawy, fune 15·16, 1991, p. 5. 
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,. ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT 
ln order to reduce the stark contrast in lhe socio-economic spheres, 
post-communist economies - contrary to a widespread opinion - need not 
just a new variation of «development aid». Aid in lhe form of direct 
subsidies may be necessary to soften the impact of the beginning transfor-
mation, when old capacities, mechanisms and altitudes have to be destroyed 
before more efficient ones ean replace them. But the CEE countries can 
boas! a high leveI of education and just1y see themselves as artificially 
exclued from the community of culture and civilization to which they 
had belonged until fifty years ago, when they were forced to leave the common 
train. The crux of the malter, though, lies with the fact Ihat fifty years 
of wrong development under contemporary conditions of rapid technica! 
progress mean immensely more than in earlier centuries. Therefore, what 
is required more than anything eIs e is participation and integration into 
the advanced world of business and administration. Hence the Westem 
world musI provide something like a training on the job by working and 
investing in the East. 
A vailable figures (") show that among foreign investors Germans 
rank first in Czechoslovakia and in Poland, whereas, somewhat surprisingly, 
they come in only second behind American firms in Hungary. CertainIy, 
much more could be used. But Westem govemments cannot dictate to 
their private corporations and businessmen where to invest; they can only 
marginalIy reduce the risks of failure. Close geographical proximity also 
has lost much of its earlier significance for investment decisions. Instead 
investment decisions are based on a broad assessment of opportunities and 
risks connected with the various countries under consideration. Given 
these circunstances, the actual levei of German engagement indicates that 
despite a number of adverse conditions like infrastructural deficits, bureau-
cratie red tape, administrative inexperience, legisla tive confusion, or potentia! 
social unrest. CEE is gaining in attraction. 
e~) See the reporl by Mal'C Fisher. in: The Washington Posto February 16. 1992, p.Al/ 
IA4b. 
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b. CULTURAL COOPERAT/ON 
Among the representatives of science and culture in Germany respect 
and admiration for their colleagues' work in the socialist countries was 
widely spread since the first encounters became possible again at the middle 
of the 1950s. ln a way, one is tempted to concIude that the cultural leveI 
of communist societies was inversely proportional to the economic 
leveI - maybe because the arts and academies at!racted many a bright 
mind, who in the west would have entered a career in business or govem-
menl. Another factor may have been the unability or the unwillingness of 
the apparatchiki to exert full control in fields where they lacked all compe-
tence. Moreover, in addition to such rather unintentional contribution of 
the system to the flourishing of the spiritual sphere, the governrnents 
undoubtedly freed not onIy servile regime artists and scientists fram the 
harsh dictates of market's laws by assigning considerable funds and facili-
ties to the cultural sector. 
Today, therefore, it is hardly necessary to intraduce the cultural wealth 
of CEE to German partners. Rather, efforts have to be made to prevent 
established contacts from disrupting because of radically altered economic 
conditions on the Eastem side. At the sarne time, following the vastIy 
increased range of everyday contacts of ordinary people as employees, 
tourists, or just teIevision watchers, it is vitally important to let them 
participate in cultural exchange as an instrument to overcome prejudices. 
The German federal governrnent, due to its !imited constitutional powers 
in cultural affairs, can only, beyond providing some general legal frame-
work, encourage regional and local administrations as well as numerous 
private organizations to develop initiatives of their own. 
ln this context a potentially controversial issue may arise fram enhan-
ced official promotion of German language instruction. The contention 
that our neighbors in CEE are ready to retum to the pre-WorId War II 
situation, when German indeed was the Iingua franca there, and that 
consequentIy German should be taught on a broad front, appears to miss 
!wo simple facts: The average person still is unable to acquire more than 
one foreign language skill. But our neighbors in CEE want to unite with 
Europe and the Western world as a whole, where English is the key all 
sorts of contacts. Alas, propagating German first might do them a disservice. 
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c. THE ROLE OF ETHNIC MINORIT1ES AND BORDER REGIONS 
The darkest period in Germany's relations with its eastern neighbors 
was conditioned also by insuffieient solutions for the numerous ethnie 
minorities within the states ereated after World War L At present we 
wateh with alarm the failure of internalional diplomaey to seeure workable 
solutions for the breakup of the Soviet and the Yugoslav multinalional 
states, At the sarne time however, ugly ineidents, when Polish citizens 
travelling through the openned borders with Germany were attacked by 
East German youths, served as a warning that nationalism and chauvinism 
can retum to Central Europe too, ln CEE only Poland is host country 
for a sizeable German minority, living predominantly in the former 
German province of apoie (OppeIn), During the years of the ccmmunist 
regime, its members preferred or were simply intimidated to conceal 
their national identity, But many continued to wait for a politicai change 
and believed in eventual reunion with Germany 
Such hopes had to be disappointed when Germany and Poland agreed 
on the final settlement of the border issue, Bonn and Warsaw inc1uded 
instead into their treaty on «good neighborhood and friendly cooperatiom, 
a model regulation which was rightly hailed as an example to be followed 
by others, The German minority is well represented in the Polish sejm 
by deputies who enjoy heigh respect among their colleagues for tlleir 
competence and for their willingness to develop the German minority 
into a positive linking factor between both nations, comparable, maybe, 
to today's role of lhe AIsace region in French-German relations ("), Recen-
tly, tllough, news reports point to resurging German nationalism in the 
apoie region ("), It seems, that the affinity of this minority for rightwing 
nationalist propaganda was established, when its members -like the East 
Germans in the GDR - were prevented from participating in a Europe 
of open borders and free movement for ideas, where mutual respect and 
tolerance could develop betler than under the communist slogans and 
banners of «brotherhood» and «friendship», 
(11) Alsace as a suitable madel has been suggested by Helmut Koschyk. ef. Frankfurter 
AlJgemeine Zeitung, October 26, 1992. p. 5. 
(1&) Tao Dziadul. in: Polityka, Nr. 40, October 3, 1992, p. 1/6; Bogumila Berdychowska, 
the director af the Bureau 00 Ethnic Minorities in the Polish ministry of cuIture and arts, in 
an interview in: Rzeczpospolita, October 24-25, 1992, p. 2. 
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Considering this lack of experience with voluntary multinational 
cooperation, probably the most promising remedy is contained in intensi-
fied cooperation between the regions adjacent to the borders between 
Germany, Poland and CzechosIovakia. Both prime ministers of Saxonia 
and Brandenburg have repeatedIy stressed this point in their agendas, and 
a number of co=on projects, like the European university at Frankfurt/ 
Oder or the various pIans for a natural park on both sides of the Oder 
river, current1y either have been already started, ar are in the preparatory 
stage ("). A somewhat similar purpose might be served by co=on 
initiatives of Bavaria and adjacent Bohemia, invoIving aIso the participa-
tion of formeI' Sudetens, who are solidly integrated into their second, 
German «heima!». Of course, different from comparable activities in Wes-
tem Europe, the initiaI financial burden for quite some time wilI have to 
be carried on German shouIders. 
Reviewing the two years since formal completion of German reuni-
fication, on balance Germany's effort to establish a network of mutual 
ties with its neighbors in CEE deserves acknowIedgement. And yet it is 
obvious that many expectations among Germany's partners in CEE have 
been disappointed. Partly because they were unrealistic. Occasionally they 
aIso seemed to originate from a questionabIe self-compIacency, where CEE 
representatives admonish Westem audiences: «We freed you from the 
threat of communism. Now it's your tum to rebuild ouI' economy». 
The main reason, however, is German preoccupation with the former 
GDR. Sometimes the formeI' a!lies of the GDR feeI distinctly envious, 
when they compare the enormous amouts West Germany is investing in 
East Germany with what they receive themseIves. But reconstruction of 
East Germany has become the cardinal problem of domestic stability in 
united Germany. No government can afford to maintain within one country 
two parts with radically differing standards of living. The sooner the 
modemization of East Germany will be compIeted, the earlier Germany's 
partners in CEE can expect to share in the take-off dynamics emanating 
[rom a rejuvenated economy just across the bordel'. 
Another concurrent feeling of negIect points to alleged German fas-
cination with Russia and draws parallels to earlier phases in history , 
(19) An extensive report is contained in a sedes af articles by Wojciech Wieczorek under 
the headline «Wzdluz Odry i Nysy», beginning in: Rzeczpospolita, May 21. 1992. p. 6. 
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when CEE was the victim of arrangements between lhe Iwo superior 
powers. Undoubtedly, Wesl Germans were fascinaled by Gorbachev's 
perestroika, and they feh more graleful lo him Ihan did the nations of 
CEE, which pride Ihemselves for getling rid of their communist regimes. 
I n lhe meantime, afler lhe breakup of the USSR and Gorbachev's politi-
cai failure, neither his successor in lhe Kremlin, Boris Eltsin, nor any 
other leader in lhe CIS evokes enthusiasm. RalheI' Germans are worried, 
as many others in lhe world, by lhe hugc pOlenlial for chaos and anarchy, 
if pereslroika will end in general «pel'estrelka» and attempls to stabilize 
lhe situalion will result in new varianls of oppressive dictatorships. Bul 
when lhe German government appeared to acl as medialor between Gorba-
chev or Eltsin and lhe seven leading industrial slales, the «G-7», it was 
clear lo ali participants from lhe outset that no conceivable amounl of 
Western aid could possibly have a decisive impacl on the future of lhe 
USSR, respeclively lhe CISo 
There is, however, a real difference in perspective: Many Germans 
are not willing to share the conviclion of mosl Poles Ihat Europe ends 
ai lhe Bug river. RalheI' Ihey emphasize Russia's contribution lo Europe's 
common heritage, in particular in the fields of Iilerature and musico They 
also poinl to Russia's potenlial bridge fllnction as a Eurasian stale. Viewed 
from this angle, the recent separation of Russia from the rest of Europe 
behind the belt of independent republics extending from Estonia lo lhe 
Black Se. is less welcomed in Germany Ihan in Poland. Nevertheless, al1 
indicators suggest Ihal in lhe foreseeable fulure neilher wil1 Russia become 
an atlractive, reliablc parlner for bilaleral hcgemony; nor will Germany 
have lhe irralional desire, and even less the means, LO forgo the tangible 
advantages of Western integration by relllrning to schemes of a different 
age of lhe pasl. 
IV. GERMANY AS A GATE TO EUROPE 
ln each of lhe politicai treaties with lhe three CEE democracies 
Germany promised lo supporl its parlners' intention to join lhe European 
Community eventualIy as fulI members. This promise does not only cor-
respond lO earlier desires of Germany's parlners. lt serves German inlerests 
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as welI. Because contrary to some SusplcIOns in West European capitaIs, 
Germany does not wish to monopolize relations with CEE. Instead 
Germany seeks to engage lhe other EC members in the giant task to 
create a realIy «Europeam) community. Throughout the last two decades, 
after West Germany's breakthrough treaties of WiI1y Brandt's «New Ostpo-
litik», Bonn had reasons to regret thal the EC did no! develop a European 
Ostpolitik: On the one hand, lhe FRG's oSlpolitik was a !arget for perio-
dic doubts among lhe alIies, whether lhe Germans would continue to 
adhere to common positions and institutions. On lhe other hand, Germany 
had to shoulder too large a burden, where it would have preferred more 
of a burden sharing. Clearly, this is even more true now that Germany 
has to assume the financial consequences of reunification. 
Recent months, though, have brought unexpected painful insecurity 
with regard to the original blueprint of Maastricht for intensified integra-
tion within the European Community. This may result in the adoption 
of a less ambilious program or in admitting various degrees of members' 
participation. While that migh! cause delays in the opening of the EC 
to new members, eventualIy it could even increase lhe CEE countries' 
chances to join, especialIy if they themselves continue to demonstrate 
within the Visegrád framework their own capacity to cooperate with each 
other, proving that national narrow-mindedness belongs to the pas! (20). 
Unfortunately, the imminent divorce of the Czechs and the Slovaks, cou-
pled with rising tensions belween Hungary and Slovakia, generates fresh 
reason for scepticism. 
Apart from their inlent to enter the EC, the young democracies of 
CEE originalIy enterlained hopes lO become also members of NATO 01' 
to receive at leas! unequivocal security guarantees by the Western alIiance. 
AI that time the Soviet Union still existed. Memories of Soviet armed 
interventions were vivid among lhe older and the middle generations, 
whereas everybody was under the fresh impression of the employment 
(lO) The member-states of the «Visegrád triangleD coordinate their efforts to join lhe EC' 
see the report 00 a joint demarche by the three ambassadors in Brussels. in: Rzeczpospolita: 
October 23. 1992. p. 8 - GeneraIly 00 internal tensions within the «triangle», ef. Andrzej 
Gra;ewshi, Kwadratura Trojkata Wyszehradzkiego, in: Polska w Europie, N,~ 9, July-September 
1992, pp. 16-22. 
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of Soviet anned forces against the rebellious republics of Lithuania and 
Latvia. Hence, the motives for CEE's request addressed at the Western 
alliance were obvious. Equally obvious, however, was the reluctance of 
NATO's members to respond positively. At least as long as Gorbachev 
was attempting to ground perestroika and «new thinking» in Soviet poli-
tics, the Westem alliance's govemments were cautious not to provoke 
the USSR by extending NATO de facto, ar even de jure to the westem 
borders of the Soviet Union. More fundamental considerations hinged 
on NATO's own uncertainty with its new role after the end of bloc con-
frontation, for which NATO had been created and developd throughout 
more than four decades since. 
Gennany, therefore, together with the United States, (") proposed 
instead a structure for mutual confidence-building and crisis management, 
in which both the Soviet Union and her fonner allies of the defunct 
Warsaw Treaty Organization would participate: the «North Atlantic 
Cooperation Counci!» (NACC). Naturally, finding themselves on equal 
status with the Southeast European states, and - after the USSR was 
succeeded by the CIS - even with the republics of Central Asia, did 
cause some irritation in CEE's capitais. The countries of CEE demanded 
not to be treated as a «buffer zone» ("). Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Poland's 
minister of defense, therefore had to explain to Polish audiences, that a 
realistic attitude should take into consideration: (I) The danger of a 
major aggression by Russia (or Ukraine) is very low for the foreseeable 
future. The CIS states will be preoccupied mainly with domestic problems 
and mutual conflicts. (2) If Poland, like the other CEE states, seriously 
intends to become a credible member of NATO, it has to prove its capa-
bility to defend its territory at least against minor incidents ("). 
Gennany will have specific reasons to delay extending its NATO 
obligations to CEE, since it can be assumed that German unifonns and 
anns still could be perceived as provoca tive, if used in regions attacked 
hati a century ago by Hitler's Wehnnacht as in former Yugoslavia. This 
(21) ln a joint statement by lwO foreign ministers, James Baker and Hans-Dietrich Genschcr 
from October 3, 1991. 
(22) Poland's foreign minister. Krzysztof Skubiszewski, repeated!y argued against such a 
treatment, d. e.g. his interview ~Przeciwko szarej strefie,., in: RzeczPQspolita, December 5, 
1990, p. 1/7. 
(1') ln two interviews with Rzeczpospolita. JuIy 28, 1992, p. 1/3. and with Palityka, Nr. 
32, August 8, 1992, p. 3. 
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does not exc1ude various forms of praclical cooperation between the mInlS-
ters of defence or common training and exchange of data and experience 
between the armed forces o[ Germany and the CEE states. Activities of 
this kind already have been initiated. 
Thus, Germany's function as a «gate» or a «bridge» to Europe should 
not be overemphasized. Ultimalely, it serves ali sides concerned, if the 
ties between the established and the youg democracies in Europe take a 
multilateral formo Bilateral alIergies can be neutralized. Similarly, the dan-
gers of dependency on one stronger partner wi11 be reduced. 
V. CONCLUDTNG REMARK 
The observations and reflections presented above, attempt to give 
a saber, realistic picture. Germany. CEE, but also a majority of the other 
members of the European family are going through a difficuIt period. 
when confidence is threatened by disappointment. uncertainty, and despair. 
ln the former socialist counlries, people begin to wonder whether their 
presenl leaders, logether with their Western advisors, are able to lead them 
out of the wilderness. (") and what they gained from the celebrated 
dismantling of the old struclUres ("l, ln Western Europe societies are 
disturbed by what they perceive as an increased chalIenge to automati-
caIly assumed steady improvements and (O cherished standards of stability. 
No grand design for comprehensive schemes wi\1 be available lo 
produce a dramatic reversal. Germany and its CEE neighbors, therefore, 
are caIled upon lo multiply (he opportunities for direct human encounters 
and common enterprises between individual members of their nations in 
urder to makc agreed «good neighborhood and fl'iendly cooperatioll» a 
('~) The capacities af post-communist neo-conservative forces and concepts to achievc 
transformation are analyzed in an exceIlent article by George Schõpf1in, in: Transit - Euro-
pâische Revue, Nr. 4 (1992); for an abridged version see: Frankfurter Rundschau, October 27. 
1992. P. 16. 
(15) A recent polI, conducted in the three CEE countrles, found sizeable percentages ar 
respondents, in Hungary even more than 60 percent, declaring their life had beeo under 
socialismo whereas anly 4 percent ai the Hungarians, 19 pereent of the Poles, and 34 percent 
ar the questioned inhabitants ai Czechoslavakia feh that their situation had improved since the 
cnd of the cammunist regimes, d. Rzeczpospolita. Octoher 20. 1992, p. 1. 
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visible, tangible reality, amending the initiatives of governments and diplo-
mats. Germans, to be true. wilI face a particular difficulty: Against general, 
currentIy prevailing trends to «go west», they wiII be asked to set their 
minds in the opposite direction. 
Christoph Royen 
185 
